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1. INTRODUCTION
This report describes the studies accomplished from July 1, 1971 through
September 30, 1971 on the extension to The Aerospace Corporation
Integrated Operations/Payloads/Fleet Analysis Study (Study A). The
studies were divided into four basic areas: Payload Data Bank, program
risk analysis, reusable launch systems, and further analyses of the Study A
final data. The status and results of the above four study areas are
described in detail in the separate sections of this report, and briefly
summarized below.
The Aerospace Data Retrieval System (program incorporating the Payload
Data Bank) is currently being modified to incorporate payload cost data
and to permit the performance of accommodation analyses. The accom-
modation analysis simply determines the payloads that can be captured
by the Space Shuttle under varying Shuttle ground rules (e. g., cargo
bay size and Shuttle payload weight capability).
The program risk analysis interrelates payload reliabilities, redundancy
levels, failure warning, reliability and Space Shuttle delay times (between
payload malfunction and its replacement) and system costs. High system
availability can be obtained by improving payload reliability and Mean
Mission Duration (MMD) at a higher cost per payload. Higher availability
can also be obtained by reducing the Space Shuttle delay time, and by use
of satellite failure warning techniques which can be traded off on a cost
basis against increased payload reliability to achieve a desired availability.
The additional analyses conducted on the Study A final data included com-
parison of midterm and final cost data, cross-checks of final cost analy-
ses and results, payload selection and cost relationships, costs assoc-
iated with launch vehicle reliability and infant mortality, and various
other checks to verify the resultant data output. Several changes were
made to Final Report data during the three month extension period, thus
invalidating much of the aforementioned analyses.
1-1
2. PAYLOAD DATA BANK
The Data Retrieval System (DARES) is currently being modified and expanded
for the purpose of including payload cost data and performing the accommo-
dation analysis. The accommodation analysis determines those Space Shuttle
payloads that can be accommodated by specific alternate Shuttle payload bay
sizes and performance (payload weight capability). The following two sub-
paragraphs describe these Payload Data Bank modifications.
2. 1 COST DATA INPUT IN PAYLOAD DATA BANK
The inputting of the cost data into the Data Bank will be achieved by developing
a subroutine to insert the payload cost data. This subroutine, titled "Data to
DARES" (DTD) will select the appropriate data from the Payload Cost Model
(PALCM) and transfer this information to cards. The PALCM data is on tape.
The punched cards will then be inserted into the Data Bank card deck for
retrieval and printout.
In addition to the development of the subroutine, the payload characteristics
for the Data Bank have been modified to list the cost data and the payload
descriptors for the Payload Cost Model. The payload descriptors serve to
indicate the payload complexity. These descriptors are spacecraft design
factor, mission equipment design factor, type of mission equipment, and R&D
fiscal funding spread.
The cost data will be listed for the basic RDT&E and unit investment costs by
subsystem, and will include total RDT&E, total investment, total operations, and
total payload costs. It was necessary to list cost data in this order since the
basic RDT&E and unit costs will not equal the total RDT&E and investment costs.
The unit costs do not include the number of units and refurbishment schedule
which are factors for determining the investment cost. The schedule is
determined by the capture analysis and is dependent on the launch vehicle
fleet considered. Thus, to reduce the number of cost schedules, the cost
data on current reusable, low cost expendable and low cost reusable payloads
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was based on Space Shuttle usage only (case C). This approach will limit the
amount of data inputed into the Data Bank. It should be recognized that all
of the payload (i. e., payload variations) costs are not available, since only
the payloads selected in the capture analysis were costed.
The current expendable payloads should be based on current expendable launch
vehicles to provide a baseline Data Bank. The revised payload characteristics for
the Data Bank are listed in Table 2-1 and an example printout shown in Table 2-2.
2.2 ACCOMMODATION ANALYSIS
The computer program planning has been initiated and some computations have
been completed for the accommodation analysis. The DARES program will
be used to perform this analysis.
The output of the accommodation analysis will be a list of payloads accommo-
dated and a list of unaccommodated payloads with reasons for rejection.
Initially, only a single payload per launch will be considered, i. e., multiple
payload launches will not be considered.
To perform this analysis the following inputs and computations must be per-
formed before the accommodation subroutine can select payloads that can and
cannot be accommodated:
1. Input the payload dimensions
2. Input the payload orbits and characteristic velocities
3. Input the generalized Space Shuttle performance
4. Input the generalized Space Tug performance
5. Select the Space Shuttle performance for each payload
6. Compute Space Tug performance for payloads that
require high energy stages
The payload dimensions and payload orbital characteristics are in the Data
Bank and can be retrieved. Elliptical orbits will be inputted into the Data
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Bank in terms of equivalent circular orbits having the same energy as the
elliptical orbits. The characteristic velocities have all been recomputed to
five significant figures. The characteristic velocities for low earth-orbits
are determined for a 100 x 100 n mi parking orbit and a Hohmann transfer to
mission orbit. Inclination effects are not included in the characteristic
velocity for low earth orbit. For the synchronous orbits, a 100 x 100 n mi
x 28. 5 inclination parking orbit and a Hohmann transfer to mission orbit,
including the effects of plane changes, are assumed.
For the planetary missions, the same parking orbit is assumed and the trans-
fer orbit assumed was a minimum impulse intercept trajectory, considering
the launch year. The velocities computed were generally less than the character-
istic velocity listed in the Data Book, except for the Uranus Orbiter, Asteroid
Survey, and Comet Rendezvous. The Uranus Orbiter velocity was probably-low
because the listed velocity is for the Jupiter swingby; however, for the listed
launch year, Jupiter will not be in a position for assistance. The Asteroid
Survey and Comet Rendezvous were also based on the Hohmann transfer method.
The velocities for these three missions will be revised upwards to the com-
puted minimum velocities.
The other listed planetary velocities are higher than the minimum computed
velocities and are rationalized as the recommended velocities to provide for
more favorable communication distances and/or transfer times.
The performance for the two stage, fully reusable Space Shuttle, including
abort capability, is shown on Figures 2-1, 2-2, and 2-3 for the cases of air-
breather engines out, airbreather engines in, and the 65, 000 lb structural
limit, respectively. For alternate Space Shuttle configurations, this type of
performance data must be provided or computed. The Space Tug performance
considered is shown on Figure 2-4. The Space Tug is defined in Volume IV
of the Integrated Operations/Payloads/Fleet Analysis Final Report. For
alternate Tugs, this type of performance data must also be supplied or computed.
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3. PROGRAM RISK ANALYSIS
In considering future applications of satellite programs for space, an area
which has direct bearing on the attractiveness and competitiveness of satellite
systems with ground systems is a low risk level or assured high system
availability and dependability associated with an operational space system,
all at a competitive cost. For instance, a communications satellite system
can be run at a lower rate of return on capital investment if the system risk
is low.
Space system risk levels can be reduced by utilizing the capabilities of the
Space Shuttle system. It is envisioned that space system risks can be lowered
so that they are comparable with present day modes of transportation and
ground-based communications. The levels of confidence for investors in
Shuttle-supported space systems should be comparable to those for competing
ground-based systems such as airlines, highways, land lines, microwave
relays, and undersea cables. It is expected that these low system risks
can be demonstrated through analyses showing potentially high satellite
success ratios, satellite availability on orbit, and insensitivity to system
predictions (margin for error).
The problem then becomes one of showing that the low risk operational space
system can be obtained using the Space Shuttle (and Space Tug) with appro-
priate payload design and operational approaches.
3. 1 SHUTTLE CAPABILITY
The Space Shuttle capabilities which make this low risk concept possible are
payload retrieval, high success ratio for launch, and flexibility of launch
schedule. Low Space Shuttle operating costs compared to expendable systems
help keep the costs of a low risk satellite system reasonable. Integrated Fleet
Analyses(l) to date have shown that payload return can generally be combined
with deployment, making the return of payloads to earth very inexpensive from
a transportation point of view.
(1)See Aerospace Corporation Report ATR-72(7231)-l, "Integrated Operations/
Payloads/Fleet Analysis Final Report," dated August 1971
3-1
3.2 PAYLOAD CAPABILITIES
Analyses to date have shown that refurbishment of payload systems and con-
tinuing of repair action such as the periodic maintenance proposed for NASA
Space Observatories on spacecraft and mission equipment should be primary
operational modes for payloads in the Space Shuttle era. Studies have also
shown the need for anomaly correction, the repair of worn-out hardware and
hardware operating in a degrated mode. Payload repair and refurbishment
will make low risk, high availability satellite operations possible for a reasonable
cost.
Other studies indicate increased spacecraft lifetime expectancy, particularly
for spin-stabilized satellites. Three-axis stabilized satellites' expected life-
times are also gradually increasing. These longer lifetime satellites use high
reliability parts and will be highly redundant; however, the system risk associated
with the satellites obtaining their full expected mean mission duration is still
relatively high. The system risk can, however, become quite low for a repair-
able mode of operation.
The lifetime for many satellites is largely determined by the lifetime predicted
for experiments or mission equipment hardware. This is particularly true
when, as is often the case, new technology is applied to the mission equipment.
For a system featuring reusable, repairable satellites, maximum use can be
made of spare spacecraft held on the ground. This is particularly true of
spacecraft with a high level of redundancy and the Space Shuttle system with
its inherent capability for changing flight plans and schedules to accommodate
unscheduled satellite repair as well as scheduled maintenance. Shuttle launch
delay from time of request for launch for satellite repair to completion of
on-orbit service is one key element in risk analysis.
Other key satellite system elements for obtaining low system operating risk
at a reasonable cost are:
(1) Satellite failure warning capability
(2) Adequate on-orbit checkout and operation of the satellite
before the deploying Shuttle-orbiter or Tug depart the
vicinity of the deployed payload.
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(3) Dependability build-up through flight experience
with the hardware in-hand.
3. 3 OBJECTIVE
The objective of this study is to establish low risk space system goals
and estimate the cost of low risk operation for space systems utilizing
the Space Shuttle.
3.4 DEFINITIONS
The following terms appear frequently in this discussion:
Availability - A measure of the degree to which an
item is in the operable and committable state at the
start of the mission, when the mission is called for
at an unknown (random) point in time. Availability
over a given period of time is the ratio of the operable
time during the period to the length of the period.
Mean Mission Duration - Integral of satellite survival
curve from zero time to truncation time. Abbreviated
as MMD.
Program Cost - Total cost to design, develop, establish,
and maintain a satellite system. Includes RDT&E and
investment costs, including spares. Also includes
Shuttle transportation costs.
Refurbishment - Complete overhaul, repair and checkout
at a ground facility. Results in a like-new satellite
in terms of operating characteristics.
Risk - A general definition of risk is the probability
of rendering the wrong decision based on pessimistic
data or analyses. For the analysis in this report,
the risk is measured by satellite availability predicted
and the margin for error associated with obtaining
this availability.
Shuttle Delay - The time period between a signal
indicating that the satellite is failing and the time that
the replacement or repaired satellite is operating.
It is assumed in the analysis of this section that the
decision to launch is made in advance in the case of
scheduled refurbishment. Therefore, no satellite
outage occurs for scheduled refurbishment. Outage
only occurs in the case of random failures. Outage
time is exactly equal to Shuttle delay for each random
failure.
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Reliability - The probability that an item will perform
its intended function for a specified interval under
stated conditions.
3.5 MINIMUM PROGRAM COST CONCEPT
The total cost of a satellite programrr can vary over a wide range,
depending upon decisions made regarding execution of the program.
In the analysis discussed in this section, the satellite program cost
is influenced by the extent of satellite subsystem redundancy selected
and the frequency of refurbishments. Scheduled refurbishments
are a feature of one maintenance strategy chosen for analysis
in this study. Other strategies can be examined (such as the use
of warnings, see Section 3. 7. 2) which will influence total program
cost. Generally, for a given maintenance strategy, changes which
decrease program cost also result in decreasing system availability.
A prime objective of a program risk analysis is to define the
combination of satellite redundancy and maintenance strategy
which produces the minimum program cost while providing an
acceptable level of system availability. This is the minimum
program cost concept. Program cost versus system availability
for the strategies of scheduled refurbishments and use of the
warning system is discussed in Section 3. 8. 2.
3.6 SATELLITES CONSIDERED
The Program Risk Analysis includes analysis of three satellites.
The first is a navigation satellite. Its design is based upon an
expendable satellite design adapted to reuse, and it is called
"Navsat" throughout this section. This approach was chosen
because sufficient, detailed Navsat weight and reliability data were
available toperform the planned analysis.
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The second satellite in the analysis is the Intelsat IV. This satellite
is chosen as a representative communications satellite.
The third satellite to be analyzed is the Nimbus-B. This is chosen
as a representative meteorological satellite.
3.7 DESCRIPTION OF NAVSAT ANALYSIS
Two basic strategies for Navsat system maintenance have been
examined. The strategies are described in Sections 3.7. 1 and
3. 7. 2. Some of the fundamental aspects of the analysis are discussed
in Sections 3. 7. 3 through 3. 7. 9. Results are given in Section 3. 8.
3. 7. 1 Refurbishment Maintenance Strategy
In the Navsat refurbishment analysis described in this section,
the Navsat system is maintained by means of the following maintenance
strategy:
(1) At specified intervals of time (e. g., 3 years,
4 years), each satellite in the system is replaced
with a refurbished satellite or a new satellite
which is identical in operational characteristics
and reliability to a new one. The satellites
removed from orbit are refurbished to like-new
condition at a ground facility and stored until
needed.
(2) In the event of a satellite in-orbit failure,
the satellite is replaced as quickly as possible
by the STS. The delay time between satellite
failure and first operation of the replacement
satellite is a variable in the analysis. The
failed satellite is refurbished at the afore-
mentioned ground refurbishment facility to
like-new condition and stored for future use.
This strategy has been examined extensively in the Navsat analysis.
Results are included in Section 3. 8.
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The Warning System
The level of unavailability of a satellite is determined by the
number of failures of that satellite and the period of time between
satellite failure and fix. A method suggested for minimizing the
occurrence of random failures has been named the "warning"
system. In this system, instrumentation and telemetry are provided
in the satellites to detect and telemeter failure of the next-to-last
redundant element in a redundant set, thus providing a warning
of potential failure to the user. Such a failure leaves only a single
path out of the original redundant paths to provide successful
operation. When this warning is received on the ground, a
replacement satellite may be scheduled and dispatched as soon as
possible to replace the operating satellite. Replacement will
be expected to occur before failure of the last redundant element,
thereby avoiding most of the satellite outage.
Warnings of this kind appear to have considerable promise when
used judiciously. For example, a method might be devised whereby,
on the basis of warnings already received, the probability of the
satellite's operating satisfactorily until the next scheduled refurbish-
ment can be assessed. On the basis of this assessment, the decision
can be made when (and if) only failed components should be
replaced or an unscheduled refurbishment should be accomplished.
On the basis of the failure information, some or all scheduled
refurbishments may be eliminated.
Strategies of such complexity are, however, beyond the scope projected
for warning studies at this point. A simpler warning strategy
has been examined first.
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3.7. 2
Briefly described, the maintenance strategy with warning is:
(1) A selected group of Navsat subsystem elements
has been provided with a warning capability.
When a warning is received on the ground,
a replacement satellite is scheduled for launch
and dispatched to take the place of the satellite
sending the warning.
(2) In addition to replacement of satellites upon
receipt of a warning, regular scheduled
refurbishments are also assumed in the warning
system analysis. This is similar to the scheduled
refurbishment maintenance strategy discussed
in Section 3. 7. 1.
Thus, the strategy examined is a combination of periodic refurbish-
ment plus refurbishment upon warning (or failure).
The group of subsystem elements assumed to have been provided
with a warning capability is called a "warning set. " The warning
set is chosen in this analysis as follows. All subsystem elements
which are redundant in the least reliable (three-year MMD) satellite
are placed in the warning set. When any other satellite design
is assumed to be provided with a warning capability, the same
group of elements is placed in the warning set. This method of
selection is not necessarily optimal; the optimum is not known
at this time.
As a concrete example, the warning system analysis discussed
in this section has been accomplished using, as a starting point,
the five-year MMD Navsat design. All subsystem elements
which are redundant in the three-year MMD satellite are placed
in the warning set of the five-year MMD satellite.
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A change in the satellite's redundancy level becomes necessary when
the warning system is used. The specific change is that all elements
in the warning set are made at least triply redundant. The reason for
this is as follows. If doubly redundant subsystem elements are included
in the warning set, then a warning is sounded when either of the two
elements fails.
Analyses of typical warning strategies have been completed. One result
of the analyses is that too many satellite replacement flights result when
a warning set includes doubly redundant elements, thus forcing the
satellite designer to triply redundant black boxes wherevef' redundancy
is employed.
Although the starting point in the warning analysis is a Navsat with
five-year MMD, the addition of redundancy to meet the warning system
requirements results in a considerably greater MMD. The reliability
of the warning set satellite is shown in Figure 3-3.
3. 7. 3 Assumed Navsat System
Listed below are basic assumptions used in the analysis:
3. 7. 3.1 The Navsat system considered in this analysis consists
of four satellites operating in synchronous orbit. Two criteria
for availability are considered. The first criterion assumes that
the four satellites operate independently like a set of communications
satellites. The availability of each individual satellite is of
interest rather than the availability of the whole set. The second
criterion for availability assumes that all four satellites
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must be operating for the system to be considered available. These
criteria are examined separately.
3. 7. 3. 2 A Shuttle and Tug are required for a Navsat satellite deploy-
ment or replacement flight. The transportation cost is $4. 9 per mission,
and the payload launch support cost for each launch is $1. 1 million.
3. 7. 3. 3 Unit costs of the Navsats are as follows: 3 year MMD, $13
million; 4 year MMD, $13. 6 million; 5 year MMD, $14. 2 million; warning
set Navsat, $17. 6 million. RDT&E costs are as follows: 3 year MMD,
$96 million; 4 year MMD, $98 million; 5 year MMD, $98 million; warning
set Navsat, $106 million.
3. 7. 3. 4 Shuttle reliability is 0. 995 and Tug reliability is 0. 970. The
probability of a successful Navsat deployment or replacement flight is there-
fore 0.96515. Shuttle intact abort capability is assumed.
3.7. 3. 5 Refurbishments are costed on the basis of the probability of
failure of individual subsystem units and costs of these units. Stated
mathematically,
i = 44
CR = (1 - Ri) C. N.1 i 1 1 1
C.=C W.
1 5s 1
-A i T RR. e R
I
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= cost to refurbish satellite
i = subscript denoting subsystem unit (the Navsat
subsystems are divided into 44 units in this
analysis)
Ri = reliability of unit i
C.= cost of unit i
N. = number of redundant unit i's
Cs = spacecraft specific cost, $18,000/lb in this
analysis
W i = weight of unit i
xi = failure rate of unit i
TR = time at which refurbishment occurs.
It will be seen in the above equations that refurbishment cost CR depends
upon the time TR when refurbishment is accomplished. In the analysis,
TR is varied from one to seven years. Refurbishments also occur after
random failures.
The equation for CR includes only hardware costs. Costs of Navsat ground
transportation, handling, and testing during the refurbishment cycle are
not included. It is expected that such costs will be introduced into the
analysis at the same time that the specific cost concept, symbolized by the
use of Cs, is replaced by a more detailed accounting of subsystem element
costs. At the present time, it is believed that the $18, 000/lb figure for
C
s
may be high, partially compensating for omission of the aforementioned
non-hardware costs.
3. 7. 3. 6 Depletion of expendables is included in the analysis;
wearout failures are excluded. It is planned to include wearout in future
analyses.
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where CR
3. 7. 3. 7 The baseline Navsat has a mean mission duration (MMD)
of four years. Designs have also been developed of satellites with
MMD's of three and five years as part of this study.
3. 7. 3. 8 Time between satellite failure and fix by deployment
of a replacement satellite is a variable in the analysis. Specific
time delays chosen are 1/2, 1, and 2 months.
3. 7.4 Navsat Availability
As discussed in Section 3. 7. 3. 1, two criteria for Navsat availability
have been examined separately:
(1) "Single satellite" availability assumes that
the availability of each satellite, independent
of the rest, is of interest. This assumption
makes the results of the analysis applicable
to satellites of communications or meteorological
types, for example, rather than to those
which are part of an inter-dependent system,
such as a navigation satellite system.
(2) "Four satellite" availability assumes that the
Navsat system is avrailable when all of the four
satellites in the system are operating satisfactorily.
When a random failure occurs in any one of the
four satellites, the system becomes unavailable
until the failed satellite is replaced.
Availability of the Navsat system over a period of time is the ratio
of total operating time during the period to the duration of the
period. This is written as
T
A= 0T
where
A = System availability
T o = Total operating time
T = Duration of time over which availability is to be
determined (ten years in this analysis)
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T would be equal to T except for the fact that random failures occur
o
which can only be remedied after a Shuttle delay time. Availability by the
first criterion (single satellite) is calculated in the refurbishment analysis
as follows:
A=
where the symbols are as defined previously plus
E = total expected number of random failures (for
F S satellites)
S = number of satellites in system (four in this
analysis)
H = Shuttle delay time (one-half, one, and two
months in this analysis).
Availability of the S Navsats considered as an inter-dependent system is
calculated in the refurbishment analysis by raising the expression given
above to the S power.
In the analysis of Navsat availability using the warning system, satellite
availability is expressed by the following:
A= 1 H F A+ W FA [I- R(] i
1 - RA (TR)
FA MA (TR)
1 - RW (TR)
* M W (TR)
Derivation of these are shown in Appendix A.
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where H is as defined previously and
MA (TR) = MMD of the set of satellite units not
included in the warning set at time TR (the
planned refurbishment time)
MW (TR) = MMD of the entire satellite at T
R using
warning set logic (warning given when
last redundant element reached) for the
warning set
RA (TR) = reliability of the set of satellite units not
included in the warning set at TR
Rs (H) = reliability of the satellite during the interval H
using "normal" logic (not warning set logic)
for the warning set
RW (TR) = reliability of the entire satellite at TR using
warning set logic for the warning set.
The expression for A is raised to the S power when the availability of S
satellites is to be determined.
3. 7. 5 Redundancy Level for Desired Lifetime
The basic Navsat data describes a satellite which has a fixed MMD. That
MMD is determined by the reliability of each of the individual "black boxes"
in its design, the amount of redundancy of these units, and the maximum
lifetime afforded by the satellite expendables.
The Aerospace OPT computer program is capable of taking a basic
satellite design with a given MMD and varying that design to achieve
any other desired MMD's. The program achieves this objective by
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varying both the redundancy level and quantity of expendables. The OPT
Program has been used with the basic Navsat data, which represents a
four year MMD, and has produced alternate designs with MMD's of three
and five years.
3.7.6 Black Box Reliability Model
The reliability of each "black box" included in the Navsat design is
described by a failure rate, Xi. The reliability or survival curve is
defined by the following exponential:
R. =e 1
1
where: R. = Reliability of the i'th black box1
t = Time at which Ri is being evaluated
The Navsat is composed of 44 types of black boxes. These, and their
failure rates, are identified in Table 3-1.
3. 7. 7 Satellite Reliability Model
The entire reliability model of the Navsat is implicitly included in
Table 3-1. For example, Figure 3-2 shows the Telemetry, Tracking
and Command (TT&C) subsystem reliability diagram. Table 3-1 shows
that the TT&C subsystem includes 11 different types of units. It also
shows how many of each of the units are required to provide satellite
MMD's of three to five years. How many are required in the warning
system examined in the analysis is also shown. This data is reflected
in Figure 3-2.
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Each of the redundant units shown in Figure 3-2 and those included
elsewhere in the Navsat design are in "standby" redundance. They
are treated as partly active while in the standby mode. Units in
standby redundancy can and do fail, although at lower rates than when
active. Their failure rates while in standby redundancy are therefore
assumed to be non-zero.
The general expression for the reliability of N redundant units of which
only one must be operating for system success (the others in standby
redundancy) is as follows:
- T N -e b] K r(B +K - 1)
R(N,T) e a F r (K) r (B)
K=I
where: R(N, T) = Reliability of the N redundant units
a Failure rate of active unita
T = Time at which reliability is being evaluated
K = Summation variable over all redundant units
Ab Failure rate of unit in standby redundancy,
le ss than a
F = Symbol for the gamma function
B = Ratio of Ab to ha (0.1 in the Navsat analysis)
The expression given above is used with each of the types of redundant
units shown in Figure 3-2 to derive the reliabilities of each of the
redundant sets. These are then used in standard reliability multiplica-
tion fashion to produce the reliability of the TT&C subsystem.
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Finally, the reliabilities of each of the subsystems are multiplied
together to produce the Navsat reliability.
3. 7.8 Satellite Reliability
Reliabilities of the four Navsat systems represented by Table 3-1
have been determined for periods ranging up to seven years. Expendables
have been increased in each case to allow reaching that seven year
point. Results are shown in Figure 3-3.
Increasing the expendables of a satellite increases its MMD. This
occurs even when the design is otherwise unchanged in terms of sub-
system reliabilities and redundancy. Thus, the lower three reliability
curves of Figure 3-3 can be integrated out to the seven year point to
show MMD's greater than the indicated three, four, and five years.
Expendable depletion points for the three, four, and five year MMD
optimal designs are less than seven years.
3. 7.9 Random Failures
The failures assumed to occur in the Navsat in this analysis are random
failures. They are equally likely to occur at any time in the operating
life of the satellite. Non-random failures are those due to such phenomena
as wearout.
For a satellite which is refurbished and reused, the number of random
failures experienced by a satellite over the duration of a satellite program
is influenced by the refurbishment schedule.
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The following equation is used for a single satellite:
ER = RS(TR) Ms(TR)
where
E = expected number of random failures during
the program
R
s
(TR) = probability of a single satellite surviving to TR
T refurbishment timeR
Ms(TR) = MMD associated with TR
Tp = program length.
When the expected number of failures of S satellites is required, the above
expression for ER is multiplied by S.
When the warning system is used, the expression for the expected number of
unscheduled refurbishment flights changes slightly. The expression becomes
ER 1- Rw(TR) MW(TR)
RW(TR) and MW(TR) are as defined in 3.7.4. Again, when S satellites are
involved, the expression for ER is multiplied by S.
3. 8 NAVSAT ANALYSIS RESULTS
Two basic strategies for maintaining the Navsat system have been analyzed,
and the results are provided herein. The first strategy has been described
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in 3. 7. 1. The results of using this basic strategy, modified in detail by
changing the refurbishment interval, are given in 3. 8. 1 through 3. 8. 3.
Results of using the warning system described in 3. 7. 2 are also included
in 3. 8. 1 through 3. 8. 3.
3. 8. 1 Availability vs Refurbishment Interval
Availability versus refurbishment interval for a single Navsat is shown in
Figure 3-4. Parameters in the figure are satellite redundancy level (repre-
sented by the three satellite designs whose nominal MMD's are three, four,
and five years), use of the warning system, and Shuttle delay time.
It is immediately obvious that the impacts of Shuttle delay and satellite
refurbishment interval are considerably reduced by use of the warning system.
It appears in Figure 3-4 that only the warning system can provide the high
availabilities desired unless both short Shuttle delay and frequent refurbish-
ment are obtained. This conclusion cannot be reached, however, until
further analysis, soon to be completed, proves or disproves its validity.
The reason for the uncertainty at this point is that Figure 3-4 does not show
a true comparison between periodic refurbishment and periodic refurbishment
plus warning. This is because the best satellite in the refurbishment analysis
is one with redundancy for a five-year MMD, while the satellite in the
warning analysis has a greater MMD because it has had much redundancy
added to the five-year design. The added redundancy can be observed in
Table 3- 1.
Figure 3-5 shows availability versus refurbishment interval for a Shuttle
delay of one month. As expected, these curves fall between those for delays
of one-half month and two months shown in Figure 3-4.
It is helpful in reviewing this data to use the relationship that an availability
of 0. 999 is equivalent to an average down time of about nine hours per year.
Over a ten year period, this amounts to about four days. Since even a single
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random failure results in a down time equal to the Shuttle delayD two weeks
minimum in the analysis, the interpretation of the high availabilities exhibited
here is that the probability of even a single failure is very lowo
3. 8, 2 Program Cost vs Refurbishment Interval
Program cost is shown in Figure 3-6 as a function of refurbishment interval.
Three levels of satellite redundancy and use of the warning system are
represented. This figure shows that the highest availabilities plotted in
Figures 3-4 and 3-5 are attained at substantial increases in program cost
over those for the lower availabilities. The figure also shows that Navsat
program costs vary inversely with the level of basic satellite redundancy.
This latter conclusion does not necessarily apply to other satelliteso Pro-
gram costs for the warning system case are higher than for the refurbishment
cases because more satellite replacement flights must be made and because
satellite costs are higher.
30 8, 3 Minimum Program Cost vs Availability
A restricted representation of minimum program cost versus availability
is shown in Figure 3-7. The restriction is that results are limited to the
system maintenance strategies examined in this analysis (described in
3. 7. 1 and 3. 7. 2).
The curve representing a Shuttle delay of one-half month is seen to be the
best of the minima. It is assumed for this figure that Shuttle delay cannot
yet be accurately predicted, that the delay ultimately realized will be a
function of the size of the Shuttle fleet, number of launch sites, Shuttle
design, launch complex design, and other factors. Therefore, all three
curves are shown. Each curve is for the five year MMD satellite design,
modified in the warning analysis by addition of greater redundancy,
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1)
As noted in 3. 8. 1, it is not intended that results shown in this section be
considered a direct comparison between periodic refurbishment and periodic
refurbishment plus warning. Such a comparison will be possible when the
needed additional data is available.
Figure 3-7 does show, however, accurate representations of program costs
versus availability for the satellites and strategies studied. In the area of
cost overlap between the two sets of data, the warning system is decidedly
superior. The superiority comes partly from the use of warnings and
partly from the greater satellite reliability.
Figure 3-8 is the first figure in this section to show results for the case in
which all four Navsats must be operating satisfactorily for the system to be
available. Results are similar to those of Figure 3-7.
3.9 INTELSAT IV ANALYSIS STATUS
The Intelsat IV analysis has not progressed as far as the Navsat analysis.
This is because of difficulties in obtaining the required data in a timely manner.
3. 9. 1 Reliability and Weight Data
Reference 3-1 contains reliability diagrams and other reliability data suf-
ficient to define the reliability of the basic Intelsat IV. Reference 3-2 contains
detailed weight data.
3.9.2 Weights for Individual Units
The reliability diagrams of Reference 3-1 show the units into which the Intel-
sat IV subsystems have been divided for purposes of estimating reliability.
The detailed weight data of Reference 3-2 has been correlated with the reli-
ability data to produce the weight of each unit. This unit/weight data will be
used by the Aerospace OPT computer program to produce optimal designs
for desired MMD's.
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Work to be Completed
The weight and reliability data will be fed into the OPT program to produce
optimal Intelsat IV designs for a range of MMD's. Selected designs,
analogous to the three selected for Navsat, will be analyzed to determine
minimum program cost versus availability. It is planned to introduce
new facets to the analysis such as the effects of wearout.
3. 10 NIMBUS-B ANALYSIS STATUS
The Nimbus-B analysis has made less progress than that for the Intelsat IV.
Again, difficulties in acquiring sufficiently accurate data have occurred.
3. 10. 1 Reliability and Weight Data
Reference 3-3 includes the Nimbus-B weight data which has been acquired
to date. The data is less detailed than required. Efforts to obtain the
appropriate level of detail have thus far been unsuccessful. Reference 3-4
contains Nimbus-B reliability data.
3. 10. 2 Work to be Completed
When the required detailed weight data is obtained, it will be correlated
with the reliability data. This will result in weights for each of the units
in the Nimbus-B reliability model. At this point, the Nimbus-B analysis
will have advanced to the present state of the Intelsat IV analysis.
Progress beyond this point will be the same for each of the two satellites
and is described in section 3. 9.3 above.
3. 11 OBSERVATIONS
The first results of the low risk analysis indicate that using failure warnings
may significantly enhance availability compared to the technique of
responding only to satellite outages between refurbishment intervals.
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3.9. 3
These analyses show that an availability of 0. 999 is predicted at a
reasonable cost with a simulated Space Shuttle supported satellite system.
Down time would thus average 9 hours per year or less for a single
satellite, exceeding by orders of magnitude predictions of availability
for current satellites. Although the satellite availability is significantly
affected by Shuttle delay time (see Figures 3-7 and 3-8), the effect is
less serious with the "warning" maintenance strategy than without it.
Thus "warning" desensitizes the predicted availability effects of Shuttle
delay. The example demonstrates that the risk associated with obtaining
dependable system operation can be low with the Space Shuttle. The
sensitivity of system availability and dependability to such items as
satellite component reliability will be demonstrated by further analyses
in the near future.
The potential for trading system costs for availability is also demon-
strated (see Figure 3-8). More work needs to be done in order to
understand these trades, for example:
1. The effects of increases in redundancy level utilizing
the "warning" strategy are being analyzed to study
reduced system costs and high availability.
2. The sensitivity of costs and availability to component
failure rate needs to be investigated to relate the
costs to the risk of satellite component reliabilities
which may fall below these specifications.
3. It is planned that the analysis be expanded to include:
(a) Additional typical satellites (Nimbus, Intelsat IV)
(b) Redundant satellites on-orbit
(c) Comparison with ground systems as discussed
in this Section.
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The results to date using the maintenance strategy with "warning" are
very encouraging and form an initial base for establishing principles
of low risk operation and applying these principles to specific programs.
3.12 REFERENCES
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4. REUSABLE LAUNCH SYSTEMS
Major launch systems activities during the Integrated Fleet Analysis study
extension period were focused on the review of NASA Phase A/B Space Shuttle
final reports, and the monitoring of the Phase B study extensions through
liaison with the contractors and NASA centers. The purposes of these activities
were to collect and assimilate Space Shuttle design and performance informa-
tion and to update system definitions as required to support capture, costing,
and equal risk program analyses. Summary results of these investigations
along with additional data analyses and reformatted information not included
in the Study A final report (Reference 4-1) are documented below.
Section 4. 1 presents Space Shuttle Phase B study weight trend comparisons
and a Shuttle weight growth projection for cost dispersion estimation purposes.
Most of this information was reported in the Study A June 1971 Technical
Monitoring/Interchange meeting, but was not documented in the final report.
Summary comparisons of the FY 71 NASA Phase A/B Space Shuttle systems
studies designs and a synopsis of the four month study extension results are
given in Section 4. 2. Performance characteristics for the Space Shuttle two
stage internal tank design and two stage design with orbiter external LH 2 tanks
(OET) are reported in Section 4. 3.
4. 1 SPACE SHUTTLE WEIGHT TRENDS AND WEIGHT GROWTH
PROJECTIONS
4. 1. 1 Phase B Study Weight Trends
Phase B shuttle weight trends were presented in the final report (Reference 4-1)
for variations in MDAC high crossrange design through March 1971. Figures
4-1, 4-2, and 4-3 present this same weight trend data extended through the
June 1971 time period to reflect the Phase B final design. Comparisons of the
NR and MDAC Phase B booster and orbiter dry weight and structure factor trends
are given in Figures 4-4 and 4-5, respectively. The calendar time variation in
Space Shuttle program major design guidelines is illustrated in Figure 4-6 for
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information and orientation purposes. Major increases in booster and orbiter
weights are shown to occur in late 1970 when the ABES fuel was changed from
LH 2 to JP-4 and in early 1971 when new Level I design requirements were
implemented. Booster weight variations during the Phase B study are shown
to have been more severe than those in the orbiter.
The NR and MDAC Phase B Shuttle weight trends for the booster and orbiter
designs (Figures 4-4 and 4-5, respectively) show similar dry weight and
structure factor trend patterns with the final weight of both elements being
slightly higher for the NR design. However, while the final booster structure
factors are very close, there is a significant difference in structure factor
values for the orbiter. Since the gross and dry weights of the two designs
are very close and the payload weight is the same, the structure factor
difference must be due to a combination of small differences in a number of
parameters including residual propellants and fluids.
4. 1.2 Weight Growth Projections for Cost Dispersion Analyses
NASA guidelines required the contractors to include a 10 percent growth
allowance in the Phase B Space Shuttle design dry weights, less GFE propul-
sion engines, to provide a margin for expected weight growth during Shuttle
design development. Contractor analyses (Reference 4-2) utilizing weight
history data for a number of previous aerospace projects concluded that a
10 percent growth allowance would have provided a 90 percent probability
of achieving program weight goals, excluding weight growth due to changes
in customer requirements (which on the average accounted for about one-half
of the total weight growth).
The Aerospace Corporation reviewed the contractor weight growth analyses
and utilized this information, in conjunction with in-house weight history data
and experience, to make independent Space Shuttle weight growth projections
for use in cost dispersion analyses. Projected weight growth from April 1971
to first manned orbital flight for the three major structural weight related
costing sub-groups is listed in Table 4-1 along with the baseline weights.
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Figure 4-7 is a graphical presentation of the Shuttle weight growth projections.
Costs of other subsystems such as engines, avionics, ECLS, etc are not
weight dependent to the same extent as the three structurally related sub-
groups noted above, and are not included in this weight projection.
The MDAC April 1971 Mass Properties Status Report (Reference 4-3) indicated
a booster growth allowance of only 5.6 percent. The first step in predicting
total weight growth for costing purposes was to resize the booster to include
the required 10 percent growth allowance. This resizing was accomplished on
the Aerospace Mass Properties Vehicle Synthesis Program (Reference 4-4).
The orbiter weight included the required 10 percent growth allowance and
was therefore not resized. Baseline and 10 percent growth allowance weights
are listed in Table 4-1 for each of three subgroups.
The predicted weights listed in Table 4-1 were determined by applying a
growth increment to each area based upon Aerospace "best judgment" after
a careful review of the design, reported detail weights and contingencies, and
degree of current state-of-the-art employed in each of the included subsystems.
These predicted subgroup weights are intended for use in Shuttle cost disper-
sion analyses and not as an indicator of actual Shuttle design or performance
characteristics. In arriving at the predicted weights, the Shuttle system was
not resized above the 10 percent growth allowance point in order to maintain
constant payload performance capability. An implicit assumption is that
when the Shuttle system weight increase exceeded the original 10 percent
growth allowance, performance improvements, design/material changes, and
additional weight reduction procedures would be instituted with increases in
subsystem complexity and cost. The predicted weights are intended to be an
indicator of these expected cost increases. It should be noted that the pro-
jections do not include weight changes due to revisions in customer requirements.
4.2 SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM STUDIES
4. 2. 1 Phase A/B Studies
The Space Shuttle is an advanced space transportation system which is intended
to transport passengers, cargo, satellites, propulsion stages, etc. economically
and efficiently between the earth's surface and low earth orbit. During
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fiscal year 1971 teams of companies headed by McDonnell Douglas and North
American Rockwell were under contract to the NASA to conduct 12 month Phase
B system studies of the shuttle. Parallel to this Phase B activity, other con-
tractor teams (principally Grumman/Boeing and Lockheed) were funded by
NASA to conduct Phase A studies of alternate Space Shuttle concepts. In addition,
the USAF Space and Missile Systems Organization funded the two NASA Phase B
Shuttle study contractors to conduct independent DoD Space Shuttle impact
studies. Table 4-2 presents a matrix of the Phase A/B studies and lists the
Space Shuttle concepts studied by each of the principal contractor teams during
FY 1971.
The original objectives of the NASA Phase B studies were to analyze and pro-
vide a preliminary design of a completely reusable two stage Space Shuttle which
met the established program goals and was supported by traceable, substanti-
ating data in areas vital to the feasibility of the system. Beginning in April
1971 design emphasis in the Phase B studies was shifted from a completely
reusable system to analysis of an orbiter with external expendable hydrogen
tanks. The DoD impact studies involved the assessment of the capability of the
fully reusable Phase B Space Shuttle for the accomplishment of DoD missions
and the identification of DoD Shuttle System modifications and associated costs.
The Phase A studies were concerned with alternate Space Shuttle concepts and
the primary issue addressed was: is there a lower cost shuttle option than the
fully reusable system?
At the initiation of FY 71 study efforts, NASA defined major shuttle system
requirements (Level I) for use by the Phase B contractors. The Phase A study
contractors proceeded with alternate Space Shuttle concept definitions. These
Level I requirements were modified during the course of the Phase A/B studies.
Figure 4-6 presents a chronology of the changes in major system requirements
during the course of these study efforts.
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Contractor Study Results
Space Shuttle vehicle designs resulting from the FY 71 NASA contractor studies
are presented in Figures 4-8 through 4-14 as noted below:
Configuration Contractor Figure
Two Stage Fully Reusable MDAC 4-8
NR 4-9
GAC/BAC 4-10
Drop Tank Orbiter-FR B/O MDAC 4-11
NR 4-12
GAC /BAC 4-13
Stage and One-Half LMSC 4-14
Table 4-3, "NASA Phase A/B Vehicle Summary, " presents a matrix of charac-
teristics of the vehicle concepts as reported by the contractors at the conclusion
of the Phase A/B studies. Pertinent information such as weight, structure
factor, vehicle dimensions, wetted area, enclosed volume, propulsion systems
and number of engines, etc., are presented for comparative purposes.
It should be noted that the Space Shuttle system baselined in the Integrated
Fleet Analysis final report (Reference 4-1) is generally similar in design and
characteristics to the final MDAC two stage fully reusable design. Thus only
small cost differences would be expected between the contractor's final design
and that utilized for Study A costing. Moreover, since the performance char-
acteristics of the two designs are essentially the same, the Study A STS final
capture analysis would not be affected.
Table 4-4 presents a summary comparison of the detailed weights reported by
the contractors for the final two stage fully reusable and orbiter external tank
design. Significant differences may be noted in the contractor detailed weights
for the various subsystem areas. This may be partially due to the fact that
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the MDAC and NR teams concentrated on the fully reusable designs for most
of the Phase B study and only spent a few months addressing the external tank
orbiter system. On the other hand, the GAC team largely considered the fully
reusable vehicle in a parametric fashion and focused most of the detailed design
work on the external tank orbiter system. It should be noted that toward the
end of the Phase B studies the NASA center teams placed most of their emphasis
on the drop tank orbiter systems.
4. 2. 2 Four Month Shuttle Study Extensions
On 1 July 1971, NASA extended the Space Shuttle contractor studies (with the
exception of Chrysler Corporation) for an additional four month period. These
studies were to address the feasibility of various expendable first stages for
use with a reusable orbiter as an interim step in a phased development program
ultimate leading to a fully reusable two stage systenm. The objective was to
keep the annual peak funding to an acceptable level ( $1 Billion per year) while
still maintaining interim manned spaceflight. A matrix of some of the various
contractor configurations studied during this extension period is presented in
Table 4-5. Figure 4-15 illustrates several of the configurations studied by the
contractors. Some of the key issues and guidelines for this interim study phase
are as follows:
(1) Use established Level I and II requirements.
(2) Use previous NASA and contractor study results.
(3) Place study emphasis on:
a. Effects of expendable tanks on vehicle size/cost
(LH 2 or LO 2 /LH2 )
b. Sensitivity of vehicle costs to payload size and weight
c. Utilization of interim launch vehicles (3 per year)
d. Definition of schedules, costs, and programmatic aspects
of candidate systems
e. Establish evolution feasibility and flow for ultimate
reusable system
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f. Landed weight of 45K payloads is 25K and of 65K payloads
is 40K
g. All 40-foot payload bay cases shall be stretchable to
60 feet
For the first two months of the extension phase, each of the contractor
teams studied the concepts assigned by NASA as noted in Table 4-5. In
mid-September the shuttle program was redirected for the final seven weeks
of this four-month interim study period. The recent redirection defines a
minimum technology program with the following primary ground rules:
Program - Two Alternatives
(1) Concurrent orbiter and booster development with reusable orbi-
ter and reusable LO2/RP booster (Mark I/II approach).
(2) Phased booster and orbiter development - S-IC flown for
five years as an interim expendable booster at a rate of
three flights per year. Reusable booster (LO2/RP) developed
after five years.
Schedule
(1) Concurrent Progranm
a. Orbiter first horizontal flight - June 1976
b. First manned orbital flight - September 1978
c. Operational shuttle - Mark I - September 1978
Mark II - September 1984
(2) Phased Program
a. Orbiter first horizontal flight - June 1976
b. First manned orbital flight using expendable S- C -
September 1978
c. First manned flight with reusable S-1C - September 1983
d. Operational shuttle - September 1984
Requirements
(1) Abort to orbit not required/intact abort is a goal
(2) FO-FO-FS not required
(3) Turnaround time during Mark I usage relaxed to approximately
one month.
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(4) Staging velocity 6000 fps ± 1000 fps
(5) No go-around capability on orbiter (ABES in payload bay)
(6) Mark II orbiter crossrange 1100 n mi
(7) Max Q - 650 psf
(8) Orbiter payload bay - 15 ft x 60 ft
(9) Crew size of four with a 14.7 psi cabin pressurization
(10) Contractors are to run horizontal flight test program. Govern-
ment will phase into test program during vertical flight test year.
(11) 40 K polar payload for Mark II orbiter; 10 K polar payload
minimum acceptable for Mark I orbiter.
Table 4-6 presents the primary subsystem technology assumptions to be used
for the remaining seven weeks of this interim study phase. Table 4-7 delineates
the contractor team efforts and areas of concentration for this period.
4.3 SPACE SHUTTLE PERFORMANCE CAPABILITY
4. 3. 1 Two Stage Internal Tank Design
Space Shuttle performance characteristics utilized in the Integrated Fleet
Analysis are documented in the Final Report (Reference 4-1), and correspond
to the capability of the McDonnell Douglas two stage, fully reusable design
(with internal tanks) of March 1971. The contractor's final design, while
differing slightly in terms of mass properties from the interim design, offers
essentially the same performance characteristics. The two stage shuttle
performance capabilities from the Final Report (Reference 4-1) are repeated in
Figures 4-16 and 4-17 for information purposes, and correspond to the maxi-
mum achieved with parallel burn of the OMS system during ascent.
Figure 4-16 presents the maximum insertion payload capability (orbiter ABES
in) the baseline shuttle can deliver to a 50 x 100 n mi orbit as a function of total
mission on-orbit delta velocity available in the vehicle for the NASA Level I
design and reference missions. A 20, 300 lb increment of payload growth
capability can be achieved, where permitted by mission operations and safety
consideration, by removal of airbreathing engines, systems, and fuel from the
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orbiter. Structural limitations in the orbiter with design accelerations and
factors of safety, could limit the maximum ascent cargo to about 65, 000 lb.
However, it may be possible to handle heavier payloads by limiting the maxi-
mum orbiter acceleration to something less than 3 g's and/or operating the
vehicle with reduced factors of safety.
The data provided in Figure 4-16 includes abort to once-around capability; the
method of achieving this is described as follows: if the total required mission
delta velocity is equal to or greater than that indicated by Line B, then mission
delta velocity is the driver. Sufficient propellants would be provided in the
vehicle (because of mission requirements) to always accomplish the orbit to
once-around. When the mission delta velocity is less than that of Line B, the
abort to once-around capability is the driver and additional propellants must
be included to accommodate the abort case. These additional propellants will
be burned in the OMS and are derived from the ascent, attitude control, on-
orbit maneuvering, and non-propulsive functions. Since the operating mixture
ratio of the OMS engines is greater than that of the ACPS and the non-propulsive
functions, an excess of approximately 3770 lb of oxygen is required when
utilizing the non-propulsive propellants in the OMS during the abort mode.
When the shuttle is loaded for the abort case (abort delta V > mission delta V)
and a normal mission is flown, the total mission delta velocity available is
indicated by Line A. This loading results in the maximum payload capability
of the vehicle shown to the left of Line A. The break between Lines A and B
represents burning of the excess 02 for the mission delta velocity values
between maximum payload (line A - abort capability the driver) and payload
with abort (line B - mission delta velocity the driver).
Figure 4-17 presents the shuttle insertation payload capability as a function of
orbit inclination. Shuttle performance as a function of mission delta velocity
can be determined at inclinations other than the design and reference missions
by cross plotting the data given in Figure 4-17.
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Shuttle payload delivery capability to higher altitude orbits was derived for the
above data and presented in Reference 4-1 for flight operations involving initial
use of a 50 x 100 n mi insertion orbit, circularization in a 100 n mi circular
parking orbit, and subsequent transfer to and circularization in the desired
mission orbit. Improved shuttle payload capability for medium and high altitude
missions can be achieved by employing a direct transfer orbit (rather than a
50 x 100 n mi injection orbit) to make full use of main tank propellant capacity.
Figure 4-18 presents the estimated payload capability (orbiter ABES out) that
could be achieved with the two stage, fully reusable shuttle through the use of a
50 n mi perigee direct insertion orbit. Low altitude performance is slightly
different than that given in Figures 4-1 and 4-2 and is due to the higher abort
allowance assumed for this direct injection mode.
The circular altitude orbit capability given in Figure 4-18 was attained utiliz-
ing direct reentry of the orbiter from the mission altitude. In every case,
sufficient on-orbit delta velocity is provided in the shuttle to enable completion
of a payload delivery mission and deboost and return of the orbiter, including
intact abort capability, if required. This is achieved by fully loading the OMS
tanks for every mission. The excess propellants in the OMS tanks that are
not required for the on-orbit velocity increment of the particular mission is
burned during the ascent phase, so that maximum payload capability is achieved.
Additional techniques for improving Space Shuttle payload capability (e.g.,
engine overspeed, propellant sharing, downrange landing, etc.) were investi-
gated at various times by the contractors but were not included in the baseline
Phase B shuttle designs. For this reason, these additional performance
techniques are not covered in this report.
4. 3.2 Two Stage Design With Orbiter External Tanks (OET)
Shuttle performance characteristics for a representative shuttle design in which
the orbiter employs two external LH 2 tanks are given in Figures 4-19, 4-20,
and 4-21. The performance characteristics were developed by Aerospace
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trajectory synthesis for the representative design (derived from a composite
of contractor data). Pertinent system weight characteristics are listed below.
Booster Orbiter
Inert Weight 480, 010* 265, 118**
Payload 40, 000***
Maneuver/ACS Propellant 830 17, 485
Ascent Propellant 2, 086, 085 975, 000
Inflight Losses 15, 438 16, 589
Gross Weight 2, 582, 363 1, 314, 192
Gross Liftoff Weight 3, 896, 555
* Includes 51, 678 lb of JP cruise fuel and 4, 084 lb of reserve fluids
*':::* Includes 17, 306 lb of reserve fluids
*:* :* Equivalent payload weight for south polar launch
Figure 4-19 presents the maximum insertion payload capability (orbiter ABES
in) the OET shuttle can deliver to a 50 x 100 n mi orbit with parallel burn of the
OMS during ascent. The three main engines employed in this design reduced
the magnitude of the "worst case" engine-out abort penalty. Corresponding
performance capability as a function of inclination is depicted in Figure 4-20.
As with the fully reusable shuttle, performance capability of the OET design
to higher altitude orbits can be enhanced by use of a direct injection transfer
orbit. Figure 4-21 presents the estimated maximum payload capability
(orbiter ABES out) as a function of circular orbit altitude that could be achieved
with the direct injection mode of operation.
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Dry Weight Variations (Less Growth Allowance)
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Figure 4-19. Space Shuttle Performance Capability
Payload Versus Mission Velocity, External Tank Orbiter
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5. FURTHER ANALYSIS OF STUDY A FINAL DATA
This section describes the additional studies conducted on the Study A final
data during the three month extension period from July 1, 1971 through
September 30, 1971. During this three month extension period, numerous
changes were made in the Final Report data from that released in the earlier
draft versions of the Final Report. The most significant change was the dele-
tion of certain DoD payload cost considerations because ot insufficient data to
support the analysis and concern that the draft data in these areas may be
grossly in error. As a result ot these changes, a major portion of the cost
analyses performed in this extension period are no longer valid. The results of
the analyses, based on the preliminary draft final data, are therefore not pre-
sented in this report. Paragraph 5. 1, however, describes some of the studies
conducted to indicate the level of effort that was expended on these preliminary
data. Studies on the corrected final data are described in Paragraph 5. 2, and
the results of these studies are presented herein.
5. 1 STUDIES PERFORMED ON THE PRELIMINARY DRAFT FINAL DATA
A brief summary of the studies conducted on the preliminary final data are
presented in this section. As previously mentioned, the study results are not
documented as the changes made to the final data partially invalidate these
results.
A major effort was expended on comparing the results of the Mid-Term Report
with the Rough Draft (Preliminary Data) Final Report. The reason for this
comparison was to verify the economic benefits of the Space Shuttle as borne
out by the Mid-Term Report. A rigorous comparison of the individual space
program total costs from midterm to preliminary final analysis was not pos-
sible due to the many changes between the two analyses. One major difference
was the smaller traffic model associated with the final analysis from that con-
sidered for the midterm. The reduction in the traffic model was influenced by
elimination of unnecessary satellite redundancy and a 12 year mission model,
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rather than the 13 year model as used in the Mid-Term Report. Further
mission model changes resulted in deletion of some space programs, addition
of others, and revision of launch rates, dates and payload weights and sizes.
Additional important differences were the inclusion in the final analysis of
an accounting of: (1) the estimated effect of launch vehicle reliability
(failure rates), (2) intact abort for the Space Shuttle, and (3) the ability of
the STS to retrieve payloads suffering failure in the first 10 hours of opera-
tion (payload infant mortality). Tables 5-1 through 5-3 summarize the pri-
mary changes in the analysis from the Mid-Term to the Final Report. Con-
sidering these major differences between the mid-term and final analyses,
several different approaches were taken to compare the two studies. Initially
total system costs and cost streams were compared on an agency-by-agency
basis to ascertain the cost differences between the two study efforts.
Further detailed cost comparisons included payload RDT&E and investment
costs, launch vehicle costs, STS cost savings relative to the current expend-
able systems and the new low cost expendable system, etc. Detailed studies
were conducted of the cost ratios (STS/current expendable system) on a
program-by-program basis for the mid-term and final analyses to further
ascertain any inherent study differences. Payload weights (spacecraft and
mission equipment) versus costs were also investigated for both the Mid-
Term and Final Reports on an individual program basis. It was noted that
the heavier payloads generally resulted in a greater STS payload cost savings,
and several of these expensive programs in the mid-term analysis were
deleted from the final analysis. In general, though total system and individual
costs did differ, a similarity of the direct operating costs between the Mid-
Term and Final (prelimninary) Rough Draft Report was apparent when the
two analyses were compared on an equal launch rate basis during a steady
state period of the fully operational phase of the STS (1982-1988).
Cost analyses were conducted on the preliminary final data to investigate the
relationship of the various cost related factors. These analyses included an
investigation of the launch vehicle and payload cost impact associated with
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launch vehicle reliability and payload infant mortality; a review of the
cost effect of the low cost payloads, including the impact of the payload
weight and cost variations on total program costs; and the effect of the
payload mean mission duration on costs.
Detailed payload cost studies and data cross-checks were also con-
ducted to ascertain the consistency and accuracy of the cost models and
data inputs. These studies included satellite unit recurring costs versus
satellite weight, payload cost per pound versus satellite weight, payload
tracking, telemetry and control weight versus total weight, payload selec-
tion checks, etc. These studies all tended to verify the consistency of the
cost model, and the cost output data.
5.2 STUDIES PERFORMED ON THE FINAL DATA
A comparison of the Mid-Term Report results with the Final Report was
made using the final data. The comparison was based on average yearly costs
during a steady state period of the fully operational Space Shuttle era (1982-
1988). The payload costs for two DoD missions were deleted from the mid-
term analysis to make it comparable with the final analysis. The results
are shown on Table 5-4. The total direct operating costs (DOC) on a yearly
basis are shown to be quite similar between the mid-term and final results.
Additional analyses were conducted on the final cost results, on an average
yearly DOC basis, to gain further insight into the relative cost breakdowns.
Table 5-5 presents the DOC for the Current Expendable Launch Vehicle
System and the STS, with the difference in costs being the savings assoc-
iated with the use of the STS. The "other" column on this table refers to the
costs associated with the Non-NASA and DoD programs combined. Also
shown on the same table is the percentage of DOC savings associated with
the following parameters: lower launch costs, increased launch vehicle
reliability, payload retrieval and reuse capability, and use of the low cost
payload designs. A further DOC cost breakdown is presented in Table 5-6
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where the average cost per year is divided into payload RDT & E, pay-
load investment and payload operations costs, and launch vehicle costs.
Table 5-7 presents the average yearly cost increases associated with the
addition of the sortie missions. This table points out the small impact
on direct costs associated with rather large increases in the mission model
traffic when operating with the STS.
A detailed analysis was conducted of the reliability effects (i. e., launch
vehicle reliability and infant mortality) on the total system direct
operating costs. The methodology for estimating the reliability effects on
system costs was first defined, and then incorporated into the computer
program to determine individual program direct costs. The results are
presented in Volume III, Appendix A of the Integrated Operations/Payloads/
Fleet Analyses Final Report, showing individual program direct operating
costs and total system summary DOC with reliability effects included. The
methodology utilized to incorporate the reliability losses is described in
Volume V of the same final report. Table 5-8 summarizes the percentage
increase in DOC resulting from consideration of the reliability effects for
all of the cases considered.
An investigation of the mission model payload activity was made for the
Final Report. Figure 5-1 presents the results in terms of on-orbit payload
population per year and the average payload launch rate per year for the
baseline mission model. Also included on this figure for comparison pur-
poses are the USA and USSR average launch rates for the years 1962
through 1970. It is interesting to note that the baseline mission launch rate
is comparable to the USSR launch rates from 1962-1970, but less than the
USA launch rates for that same period. Furthermore, though not apparent
on the figure, the USSR launch rate is sharply increasing every year with
an extrapolated indication of a much higher launch rate than the current
study baseline model for the 1982-1990 time period.
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Some studies were conducted of individual program costs, using the
Current Expendable Launch Vehicle System and the STS, to emphasize
relative cost comparisons. Figures 5-2 and 5-3 present the program
direct cost streams associated with the Non-NASA Polar Earth Re-
sources Program for the Current Expendable System and the STS. The
costs are broken down into Payload RDT & E, payload investment, pay-
load operations and launch vehicle direct cost. This figure points out
the particularly large payload investment savings that can be achieved
with the STS for an on-going operational type of program. Though pay-
load investment savings can also be important for smaller research
oriented programs, they become the major cost savers for most of the
operational programs.
In addition to the above described studies performed during the three
month study A extension period, several briefings were presented in
support of the NASA Space Shuttle efforts. The following listing presents
briefings that were presented or supported by The Aerospace Corporation:
Aerospace Presentations
PSAC Space Shuttle Panel Briefing, 15 Aug. 71
Dr. Naka, Office of Under Secretary of the Air Force,
16 Aug. 71
GAO Briefing, 25 Aug. 71
Col. Tiernan, SAMSO, 24 Aug. 71
Col. Davis, SAMSO, 24 Sept. 71
Florida Contractors, 29 Sept. 71
Aerospace Supported
LMSC Presentation at GSFC, 22 Sept. 71
5-5
~U) U) 4)
§U ~ ~ ~ ~ c o
_-4 444 4-4 4 c014 Nc .x c 0
4H Cd N -od c o
En 02~~~~~~~~~ r)) -, -4
U .
64 Ci2r; a, 
:J o o~
at)
-4V
,.-
a)
hO
4)
(I
a)
-I,
u
Q)
bD
4)
>
a)
U)
0
V
U)
H
V S-
a~r¢ =
p4 4 ) l
Q Q_
0,~
o
rJu
:3.d
q ,
o E
z U0
o
-4 .bo u
Q h: e
U)
o
- o
CO
0U)
I4)-h 
o
o
q) W
Q) 1:4 , 
5-6
Z
D -4
) z
Cd
--4 i
in
a
4)
o
-4
q4
o
4)
0
-4
o
0
U)
4)
U)
o
o
rn
.-4
4)
0
0
-14
4)
U)
N __ (
_ _)
Cd~~~~~~~~~~~~~~r
(d
q~
3~~~~o
~~~~~~~~~0 00
O ajD . O
C0 ce mqD
~~~~~~~~~~~0 CDk E t. 0qL k
(d (d (d~~
C, CI CI 
k
&o90 .0
4.4 r .- cd
r. w
a " ^
O- > (
o
p) d 0 -1: a4
o0 (
.'rd
0
(d V.
N 4) V rn X U 
1 a) h r 
- > Q N 
0 UM 
64Z 44 P
1 41..q
o
o
cQ,
c
0
'UO
o 4~
N ,
-4
10
Q) 4
94 P
n~
Cd
o
-4l
>1
M
U) 41
Hn 
a)
u 4J
aD >
0 ul
4) :^
Q -4
,-4
V 
,-4
r-
_
ZC9
.H
aq 
- --
I E
O
0
o-
, -
m 
III--
Q w
a)r. -
(d 
or-4
k4]
0.,
cO
a)
(d
k
P.
,r-
x
o
o
r.e
cd
Q
X
0
x
44
.,.
u
(Is
q
u
Q)
u
U)
14
M.4~tocdC
.,O
cd 0kr CD4 o
OE:
to
c ,5
cd cd0
ed En 
>' U) It
wl0 MIE')
h on~r.
Q 0
Q 4:
( ht
o ao
cdQ . ,
o .~ j::H :
M
ca
k
,l
-
Q
Ir.
0
(d
>1
-4h
o
_q
o
-
0
Cd
Cd
0
Cd
1:c
U
0an
4n
10
o
0
1-
>1
It
a4
<
Cd
o
¢
dd
5-7
Cd 0 r~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~[- 00 cn 0 a', a ~~,-
-, ¥o 
o~ to 0
(d~~~~~~~~~~~~( (D
o0 < 
k E
a~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~a
z z
I~ m
0 
· 
,-,v44 o0
00 u t h $ > w h X Q u
o=.0 O 
~ O ~ I O A ) Q .,
. -Z
U k 1 UO 
Q) 00 k ka ed~ a t k C0 
4 j
oCU a ~ o o
co - o m m- zz0 
W~~~~~~~~~U) En k to
Ul a En d V) 
rC (
W rd " J 
U 0 U 0 4) 4 0 a) O 09: P4 ZC) aC1.4 z L) z Q 
Z
,-
0
A
_
L -
(0
P-4 a,
!-4
I w
o z
Uq rn
h Z
w
ma
*H r
P, 
Cd 
En 2
2,
~Oto
r. 
0
h
(P
-,-4
au
,Q
9
bo
r.
w
0cq
k
0
10
4-)
O
I,-P4
.H
crk
;j
04
r~~~~~~~~~~~r
O ~~O P ~d E t
,, ur 16 oP ·~~~~~~~U 4 0 A 1 0
·-, a w c a Lrs p >ct ~ X o _ p q,
[ '" '- '~ ~ ~ ~,1.-
ut uz E
~~q 10 0 .- 0D
-4 t )
0 ~ ~ 0
o0 00 E U ~in CO O C4C C , c c ~ 
W k , m O ie) Cd -4fZ4 P P P 0 0
~~~I r~~~~~~ t:~~P
5-8
o o o
-r o 0
r N _ T
-_ co 0
- 0 (N
0H
cc
¢ H
Z O
-qZ¢z
-4
A
'-4
HIn
0
L)
U
0
<c
H.
ooc
oo
00
U) I
U)C
.,-I
-4
o
cd
Id 
X
V
,-4
0
n
U) 
0'<
U-
U
0
z
U)
z
<
U)
¢c
C
N
U)
H
U]
U)cc
Q
Z
H
uZ
z
(O
<c
0
U
004
-4
0
0
0
U)cc
0
z
H
H
U
-4
5-9
iI
IIII
A0 p
io-
U 
O 
o r-
N r- n
·- 0 0
¢ U r ; cn 0
U¢) i > i ,
-_ --
U e) Ocq
tffO
z
Hw 
z 
>4
u 
U)
U)
2zH
U0
V
U)
U)
0
0eIU~
U)
['4
U)
0
U
U)
U)
-- I
-1
_12
w Z
: 
VZOZ
U)
X X iC
H I H
0 u -C
t-~ P
5-10
9- e- cr e-(In ( O0 0Ir) -I QN 
4,
u
Cd
U)
0
a,
0
o
o
-(
4
0
bS
aJ
>r
U)
pr
n-
U)
Z;
U H
m ¢
O 0
60
U)
[4
U)
0
0
2
ez- ci o i U
W OA -- -
C6 6; 6 Cc
Vj
3Z 2 LU
L> _ J-
Co - 0Ocx 0
0 - 0 0 
O O a C
-.>_ _. Z
< < <z_ <
e 0 ao< -j I
-J
5-11
(v
;-4
U)
o
'.
--4
2c
02
o
4- -
(D
aO
<
P.4
0
¢
'41
£3)
-
O
z
0
Ln
-J
o~
C
0
C-)
0-Or_0
r-
R
(A
o
I
Ln
H
dL
i i
Dcv%
LLJL
m A
1P
--
O0E
z
0
(A
.-
co
iU
0
--
_.
I
z
5-12
co
(oo
o'I
U)
aV U
o.o
-4o'0
4'-4 
aw
Ok
O
o
i O
.Cd
(O
9 >
.X
U
w
E
{3
(J
w
I
*
i
e A * * * g%O %o % O OO 00
%6 e Cj qj Cuj
Ln C
< I IC- < co uD u C- Do
5 -13
c(0 LrJ
r h=
U -
1 LL-
m -
m CID
0
-
to
CD
0
0
u
0,
CD
E
C-
0
.4
H
I 
I *03
I 0
I
I D
IL__ ___ __, i
(DI =
.< 5J .4CrZ ,,§ s
>: CZ i C c
c< -j l.>-
0
5 -14
0
0)
i, 
O
a)
0)
a)
a,
o0
z
O
-J
)-O-
C>
CD
,-4
"4
>
4)
a
o
0
-- 4
-4T
If)
O-
o -
co
a:-o-
O3 
o,
o,
aO
lr
n
Uh
0
to-()
4c
LL-
O
0
c,
UU-, 00
I
Cl
I
II
_
L, 
lu N
_ /
C-
I-
)o~
co
,
Cd
, o
._~ <~00 
4A~~~~~~~~~ 
OA 4ork ~~ ~ ookc C~
CPI ~~ ~
rE6c n
5-15
a)
._u v~~~~~.-,
C .
Q CD
-X i
a
:L J
_ -E
_-
o
tA
V;;0
Q)
0
Or. .C= ·V4.
= r-
5-16
--- I 
- I
00
10
rt
o
wo
k0
O U
0 ,,
00
00
00
f-
'0
c
,4
I
Co
cY
-j
V)
2
._
>-
i,
APPENDIX A
DERIVATION OF EXPRESSION FOR AVAILABILITY OF A SATELLITE
USING THE WARNING SYSTEM
The average availability, A, of a system which can exist in either of two
states, operating satisfactorily or not operating, can be expressed by the
following equation:
T - TN
A = TN (1)
where T = time period of operation of the system over which
availability is to be determined
TN = integral of time periods during T that the system
is not operating.
A part of the strategy of using the warning system with a satellite is the
inclusion of regular, scheduled satellite refurbishments. The operating
satellite is removed from duty on a regular schedule and replaced with a
satellite of equal expected lifetime (MMD). There is no loss of the satellite's
function during the changeover because the replacement satellite is put into
operation before the operating satellite is removed from duty.
Because of this scheduled refurbishment plan, the availability of the satellite
over any time period is determined by its availability during each refurbish-
ment interval, TR. This assumes that T is greater than T R and that
availability during the fractional part of a refurbishment interval occurring
at T, when T is not evenly divisible by TR, is the same as that during a full
refurbishment interval.
Constant satellite failure rates are assumed. The failure rates of satellites
and subsystems with redundancy are variable, however. Therefore,
assumption of constant satellite failure rates is an approximation. It is an
acceptable approximation in many cases, however, because a constant failure
A-1
rate can be set equal to the time average of the real values of the failure
rate. This approach leads to acceptably accurate estimates of the number
of failures. An example is given in Figure A-1.
The reliability of a system with constant failure rate X at any time t is
R (t) = eXt (2)
The integral of the reliability over a period of time is the MMD for that
time period. For a warning set satellite, the time period of interest is
the refurbishment interval, T R.
Therefore,
T R - kT R
MMD (TR) j e tdt =1 e (3)
O0
Cross-multiplying Equation (3) and recognizing that e kTR = R(TR) by
Equation (2), it is found that
1 - R(TR)
M(TR) (4)
where M(TR) = abbreviation for MMD (TR).
Equation (4) represents the failure rate of an arbitrary set of subsystem
elements during the refurbishment interval, TR. kA can be defined as the
failure rate of all the satellite subsystem elements not in the warning set
and can be written as shown in Equation (5). The subscript A has been
added to R and M of Equation (4).
1 -RA (TR)
XA MA (TR) (5)
A-2
Similarly, XW can be defined for a whole satellite, with warning set logic
being used for the warning set elements, as follows:
1 - RW(TR) (6)
w MW(TR)
But X W is not a satellite failure rate in the classical sense. This is
because warning set logic is used for the warning set elements. Xw is
instead a combined rate of actual satellite failures from non-warning set
elements, plus warnings from the warning set elements. Thus, XW includes
X A' The warning rate from the warning set elements is given by
WW w- XA ( 7)
The probability of a satellite failure during a Shuttle delay period, H, is
P = 1 - Rs(H) (8)P=I-RS( ) ( )
where RS(H) = reliability of the satellite at the end of interval H using
"normal" logic (not warning set logic) for the warning set.
A Shuttle delay period is the time period between a signal indicating that
the satellite is failing or has failed and the time that the replacement satellite
is operating. The major portion of Shuttle delay is assumed to consist of
waiting to schedule a trip on the Shuttle (and Tug).
Equation (8) applies to any interval of duration H within the refurbishment
interval. The number of warnings issued by the warning set multiplied by
P of Equation (8) gives the expected number of times that a failure is
experienced by the satellite during all intervals H that replacement satellites
are being put into orbit.
A-3
Because of the assumption of a constant failure rate, satellite failures occurring
during an interval H can occur anywhere in the interval with equal probability.
They therefore occur, on the average, at H/2, thereby producing outages
that average H/2 in duration.
The total outage experienced by a warning set satellite can now be expressed
as the total from two sources. The first is the expected number of failures
occurring in the non-warning set elements times H. The second is the expected
number of warnings sounded by the elements in the warning set, times the
probability that a failure will occur during the interval H while a replace-
ment satellite is on its way, times the average outage duration.
The expected number of failures is the failure rate times the time. For the
non-warning set elements,
EA MA(TR) TR (9)A (TR
For the warning set elements, the expected number of failures is
EW W[ M-[ (R ] [lM (ATR [1- R [H)] TR (10)
W M W(TR) M A (MT R )
It is convenient to make the following definitions:
FA = [-RA (TR) (11)
FW = M-(TR) (12)
[1 -RwT
A-4
F A and F W are equal to XA and X in this derivation, but the symbols
are changed because subsequent usage can consider FA and FW in a more
general sense than XA and XW would normally be used.
It is now possible to write the availability of the warning set satellite.
Beginning with Equation (1) and using the word description of satellite
outage given earlier, it can be written that
TR - FATRH - (FW -FA) [1 - R(H) (TR) 2
A = (13)
TR
Cancelling out the TR's and rearranging terms results in
A = 1 - H FA + 2 1 - RS(H) (14)
This expression for the availability of a warning set satellite is believed to
be a very good approximation.
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